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IS “POLICING FOR PROFIT” REALLY A POLICE POWER
EXCEPTION? CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE AS AN EXCESSIVE
FINE AND THE POLICE POWER EXCEPTION TO THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
ABSTRACT
When parallel bankruptcy and civil forfeiture proceedings arise, trustees
and creditors are confronted with the issue of whether the police power
exception to the automatic stay applies. Courts have widely ruled that civil
forfeiture is a police power exception to the automatic stay because of its goal
to deter crime and lack of monetary incentive. However, forfeiture has
increasingly been viewed as excessive and unrestrained, often used as a tool to
acquire funds for local government and law enforcement agencies.
This Comment argues that where a civil forfeiture is an excessive fine or
there is an innocent owner, such as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, the
police power exception to the automatic stay should not apply. The effect on
those actually punished by the fine, the creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding,
must be considered.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court recently declared that the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment is a fundamental right and therefore
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Due
Process Clause).1 Thus, states may no longer impose excessive fines in the form
of in rem civil forfeiture.2 The Supreme Court recognizes the need to protect a
wrongdoer from a forfeiture that violates the Excessive Fines Clause, yet when
that forfeiture is intertwined with a bankruptcy proceeding, innocent creditors
are not given the same consideration. The government is able to remove property
from the bankruptcy estate through civil forfeiture as a “police power” exception
to the automatic stay. Courts recognize criticism of civil forfeiture and the need
for limitation across the entire country, except when the wrongdoer has also
declared bankruptcy and it is the trustee striving to keep the property to protect
the creditors.
This Comment asserts that public policy, along with the inadequate
protections found in the Bankruptcy Code, demands the following solutions: (1)
the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines and Innocent Owner analyses should be
conducted by the bankruptcy court when determining whether the automatic stay
applies; (2) the culpability of the creditor(s) should also be considered when
discussing the Excessive Fine and Innocent Owner defenses; and (3) Congress
should enact legislation providing that if the bankruptcy courts cannot retain
jurisdiction and the forfeiture proceeds, the Attorney General should at least be
accountable to the bankruptcy court when distributing the assets from the
forfeiture.
There is an obvious conflict between a civil forfeiture and bankruptcy
proceeding because of the dispute over property. The principal purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to provide debtors with a fresh start, yet the purpose of civil
forfeiture is generally understood to be crime deterrence and even punishment
in some cases.3 Crime deterrence and punishment are important purposes, but
sometimes the owner of the property is entirely innocent.4 Even if the owner of
the property is not an “innocent owner,” creditors should not have to suffer for
1

Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
Id. at 691 (“regardless of whether application of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures
is itself fundamental or deeply rooted, our conclusion that the Clause is incorporated remains unchanged.”).
3
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
448–450 (1989)); Tamara R. Piety, Note, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has
Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 920 (1991).
4
See Piety, supra note 3 (explaining that civil forfeiture statutes are “contrary to natural justice” because
they are a form of criminal strict liability) (quoting Beaudry v. United States, 79 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1935)).
2
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a debtor’s wrongdoings. Civil forfeiture, if allowed to proceed, removes
property from the bankruptcy estate and therefore leaves fewer assets for
creditors to be repaid what they are owed.
The Excessive Fines Clause and Innocent Owner defense are only relevant
when the property forfeited is “facilitating property,” because that is when the
civil forfeiture is punitive. There are three types of civil asset forfeiture: (1)
forfeiture of contraband; (2) forfeiture of proceeds; and (3) forfeiture of
facilitating property.5 This Comment focuses on the third type, forfeiture of
facilitating property, because the forfeiture is inherently punitive. Seizure occurs
not because of the type of property, but because of the property’s use. The
punitive nature of this type of forfeiture allows for the argument that forfeiture
violates the Eighth Amendment as an excessive fine. First, forfeiture of
contraband is the least controversial forfeiture, because it involves the forfeiture
of illegal drugs, obscene material, or adulterated food.6 The purpose of
contraband forfeiture is not to punish the owner, but to remove the material from
circulation.7 Additionally, there is no concern about owner’s rights with
contraband forfeiture because, by definition, possessing the property is illegal.8
Therefore, contraband forfeiture is not punitive.9
Second, forfeiture of proceeds originally meant forfeiture of stolen
property.10 However, courts and federal statute expanded the definition to
include “earnings from various illegal transactions.”11 Often, forfeiture of
proceeds is used to confiscate money from drug trades because one should not
be allowed to profit from criminal activity.12 The theory of unjust enrichment
suggests that the claimant never had a legitimate right to the property.13
Therefore, forfeiture of proceeds is not punitive either.

5
David Pimental, Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the Excessive Fines
Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 541, 545–46 (2017).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 546.
8
Id. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1965) (explaining
that the return of contraband and recognizing property rights in it would violate the express public policy making
the items illegal).
9
See Pimental, supra note 5, at 546.
10
See id.
11
See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 459 (1996); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S.
111, 121 (1993); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2019) (federal statute expanding the definition of “forfeiture of proceeds”
to include profits from illegal activity).
12
See Pimental, supra note 5, at 546.
13
See id.
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The third type, forfeiture of facilitating property, or the “instrumentalities”
of the crime, is the most likely to raise constitutional issues because the
government is taking both licit and legally acquired property.14 The property is
only forfeitable because of how it is used, not what it is. Under this type of civil
forfeiture, it is common that the property’s true owner is entirely innocent.15 For
example, imagine that someone’s car was seized while it was borrowed or stolen
because of a possession offense and the owner had no knowledge of the
existence of drugs in the vehicle.
If the debtor is an innocent owner like in the aforementioned hypothetical,
the debtors’ fresh start in the bankruptcy proceeding gets interrupted. This is
because the debtors must attempt to prove their innocence in the forfeiture
proceeding before their bankruptcy case can proceed. Forfeiture allows the
government to seize the property without compensation or regard for any
ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. The government can ignore creditors’ rights
and the entire bankruptcy process. Even more so, there are creditors who expect
payment in the bankruptcy proceeding, perhaps even with liens on that property,
that the government just told their rights are not as important as the
government’s own interests.
This Comment first discusses a recent Supreme Court case that incorporates
the Excessive Fines Clause, Timbs v. Indiana, along with additional public
policy arguments surrounding civil forfeiture. Next, this Comment explains why
the automatic stay is determinative to parallel forfeiture and bankruptcy
proceedings, regarding the relation-back doctrine, jurisdiction, and traditional
injunctions. Then, this Comment lists possible expansions of the property of the
estate.
The Analysis section first evaluates the inadequacy of seeking an equitable
remedy from the Attorney General. Next, the Analysis section outlines how
courts interpret and apply the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings. The
automatic stay is an injunction on any attempts to collect property of the debtor,
including litigation, after commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding.16 Finally,
the Analysis section concludes with the importance of using the Excessive Fines
Clause and innocent owner defense to prove the police power exception to the
automatic stay does not apply.

14
15
16

See Pimental, supra note 5, at 547.
See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 455.
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2019).
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BACKGROUND

Before discussing the importance of the Excessive Fines Clause analysis and
innocent owner defense in determining whether the automatic stay applies, it is
necessary to understand the public policy issues surrounding civil forfeiture and
why the automatic stay is so determinative. First, this section of the Comment
discusses Timbs v. Indiana, the recent Supreme Court case holding that the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated to the states. Next,
this section provides further public policy support for limiting civil forfeiture.
Then, there is an explanation of how the automatic stay affects both the relationback doctrine and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Finally, it becomes clear
that the automatic stay determination is crucial because of the inadequacy of an
ordinary injunction request and lack of available protections from the
Bankruptcy Code.
A. Public Policy
Civil forfeiture is an overused, abusive form of punishment that allows the
State to profit off of mistakes of its citizens. The need to limit civil forfeiture has
been recognized across the political spectrum and even recently in the Supreme
Court. Yet in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, civil forfeiture is
considered a police power exception to the automatic stay. The public policy
surrounding civil forfeiture makes it clear why civil forfeiture should not always
be considered a police power.
1. Supreme Court Decision Involving Civil Forfeiture
In Timbs v. Indiana, decided in February 2019, the Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The decision makes the
arguments regarding parallel civil forfeiture and bankruptcy proceedings
especially relevant.
Tyson Timbs used his father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase a $42,000
Land Rover.18 In 2013, the authorities found Timbs with heroin at a traffic stop
and charged him with Class B Felony for dealing heroin and one count of
17
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Timbs v.
Indiana in June of 2018); Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional,
Violates the Eighth Amendment, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/
2018/06/19/supreme-court-will-decide-if-civil-forfeiture-is-unconstitutional-violates-the-eighth-amendment/
#750f33137165.
18
State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017).
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conspiracy to commit theft.19 Nearly two years later, in 2015, Timbs pled guilty
to the charges.20 The court sentenced Timbs to six years—one year in
community corrections and five years suspended to probation.21 Additionally,
Timbs paid fees totaling about $1,200 in exchange for his plea.22 The maximum
statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, yet the State also
sought to seize his $42,000 vehicle through civil forfeiture.23 Timbs served his
time, paid his fees, remained clean from his addiction for three years, and fought
to get his life back on track.24 Having his vehicle would have helped his reentry
to society by allowing him to more easily commute to work and rehab.25
Timbs challenged the forfeiture of his vehicle as an excessive fine in the
Supreme Court. He is a good example of someone seeking a fresh start in life,
similar to a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy. Since the Court held that the
Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Due Process Clause, the ability of
creditors and trustees to assert this defense in the bankruptcy court is crucial to
stopping the property from getting taken out of the estate through civil forfeiture.
Further, the interpretation that the excessiveness analysis must account for the
owner’s possible lack of culpability creates a strategy for creditors to assert this
defense in the civil forfeiture forum. Many groups supported Timbs’ case and
see civil forfeiture as a way for the government to “fill budgetary needs.”26 One
city attorney described civil forfeitures as a “gold mine” and a police chief called
civil forfeitures “pennies from heaven.”27
Even the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), is calling for the end of government
abuse of asset forfeiture.28 The DPA filed an amicus brief in Timbs signed by
groups all across the political spectrum including the following: “the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The Brennan Center for
19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Institute For Justice, Supreme Court Asks: Can States Impose Excessive Fines?, YOUTUBE (Sept.
5, 2018), https://youtu.be/FPml1UTijf0.
25
See id.
26
Brief of Drug Policy Alliance, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Timbs v. Indiana, 138
S. Ct. 2650 (2018) (No. 17-1091).
27
Dick M. Carpenter II et al., Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit, The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture
at 15 (Nov. 2015), https://bit.ly/2CoVh7l (surveying state laws) (quoting former Las Cruces, N.M., city attorney
Harry S. “Pete” Connelly, Jr. and Columbia, Mo., police chief Kenneth M. Burton); see also Brief of Drug Policy
Alliance, supra note 26, at 8–9.
28
Press Release, The Drug Policy Alliance, DPA Files Amicus Brief in Supreme Court Case Arguing
Excessive Fines Clause Should Rein in Asset Forfeiture Abuses (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.drugpolicy.org/
press-release/2018/09/dpa-files-amicus-brief-supreme-court-case-arguing-excessive-fines-clause.
20
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Justice at NYU Law School, Americans for Prosperity, Law Enforcement
Action Partnership, FreedomWorks, Independence Institute (Colorado),
Libertas (Utah), Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, Drug Policy Forum of
Hawai’i, Rio Grande Foundation (New Mexico) and Alabama Appleseed.”29
The groups are aware of the reality that asset forfeiture is not working in its
intended way. Forfeiture, although originally intended to limit drug-trafficking,
has targeted mostly low-income individuals with little or no criminal activity
connection.30 Legal Director for the Criminal Justice at the Drug Policy
Alliance, Theshia Naidoo, expressed her feelings regarding the amicus brief:
The brief that the Drug Policy Alliance filed today, flanked by
organizations from across the political spectrum, is a powerful
argument for reform of a system that has gone unchecked for too long.
This coalition brings to the Supreme Court a unique perspective on the
constitutional issues that are implicated when the government intrudes
into the lives of its citizens.31

The Court, recognizing that the “[p]rotection against excessive fines has
been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history[,]” ultimately found
that the Excessive Fines Clause is both “‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”32 Therefore,
the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Due
Process Clause and “there is no daylight between the federal and state
conduct it prohibits or requires.”33
2. Further Public Policy Support for Limiting Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture has been recognized as abusive and overused long before the
recent Timbs decision incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause by the Due
Process Clause. While the War on Drugs is an important fight, it has led to an
unprecedented increase in civil forfeiture proceedings.34 The Institute for
Justice, a nonprofit organization actively against unrestricted civil forfeiture,
conducted a study finding that annual forfeiture revenue doubled across fourteen
states between 2002 and 2013.35 The result—hundreds of millions of dollars to
29

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
33
Id.
34
Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities
and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1118 (2017).
35
Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional, Violates the Eighth
Amendment, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2018/06/19/supreme30
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law enforcement.36 Because the proceeds from civil forfeiture often go to the
enforcement agency itself, agencies use civil forfeiture as a tool to fund their
operations.37 Agencies mostly seize assets from the poor and people of color.38
The fact that the money from forfeitures goes straight to enforcement
agencies interferes with one of bankruptcy law’s purposes: the fair distribution
of the creditor’s property to the creditors. State and local enforcement agencies
were not originally creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding, so it is unfair that
they are able to take property out of the estate and keep most of the proceeds.
Along with the fact that the enforcement agencies are profiting from the
forfeitures, civil forfeiture also does more harm than good because of its
disparate impact among social and racial classes. Three states—North Carolina,
New Mexico, and Nebraska—have eliminated civil forfeiture entirely.39 In the
past four years, there have been reforms to civil forfeiture laws in thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia.40 A huge issue is that civil forfeiture is an in
rem action against “guilty” property. Thus, an owner’s property can be taken
away without the owner ever being convicted of a crime.41 However, fifteen
states now require a criminal conviction for most or all forfeiture cases.42
Additionally, we have seen support for limiting forfeiture from Supreme
Court justices in instances before Timbs as well. In 2017, in a concurrence where
the Supreme Court declined to hear the case of Lisa Olivia Leonard, Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote, “this system where police can seize property with
limited judicial oversight and retain it for their own use— has led to egregious
and well-chronicled abuses.”43 Thomas further criticized how “‘forfeiture
operations frequently target the poor and other groups least able to defend their
interests in forfeiture proceedings,’ who in turn are ‘more likely to suffer in their
daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item of property, such as
a car or a home.’”44
court-will-decide-if-civil-forfeiture-is-unconstitutional-violates-the-eighth-amendment/#750f33137165.
36
Id.
37
Brief of Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 26, at 2.
38
Id.
39
Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, INST. FOR JUSTICE (2018), https://ij.org/activism/
legislation/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights/.
40
Id.
41
See Morgan Cloud, Government Intrusions Into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee
Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY L. J. 817, 820
(1987).
42
Civil Forfeiture Reforms, supra note 39.
43
Nick Sibilla, supra note 35.
44
Id.
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Thomas specifically references discrimination and supports the concept that
forfeiture is not only making the fresh start of a bankruptcy proceeding
impossible, but also could be causing the bankruptcy itself. The use of civil
forfeiture as a tool to discriminate is a serious issue. Recent studies have shown
that low-income and minority individuals are disproportionately affected by
civil forfeitures.45 These individuals are often people who cannot afford to hire
representation to defend their property.46 Sometimes, they might be individuals
who are already in the process of a bankruptcy proceeding, or who are forced to
file bankruptcy because of the unfair seizure of their property.
A research study from 2007 found that civil forfeiture was used more
frequently both in areas with a high portion of African-Americans and in
communities with higher degrees of economic inequality.47 Studies continue to
show race and income discrimination.48 The Center for American Progress
directly supported the idea that certain forfeitures can substantially interrupt or
even ruin a debtor’s promise of a fresh start in a bankruptcy proceeding: “The
seizing of cash, vehicles, and homes from low-income individuals and people of
color not only calls law enforcement practices into question, but also exacerbates
the economic struggles that already plague those communities.”49 Under a
chapter 13 bankruptcy case, a debtor must file a plan in which future income is
given to the trustee to repay creditors before any discharge can be achieved.50 A
seizure of a debtor’s home or vehicle can make it very difficult for a debtor to
carry out that chapter 13 plan and thus both the creditors and the debtor are
affected.
The Center for American Progress asserts the claim that the only thing
people in these communities are often doing “wrong” is being disconnected from
the financial mainstream, and thus carrying large amounts of cash.51 Not having

45
Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities
and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1117 (2017).
46
Id.
47
Robert Helms & S.E. Costanza, Race, Politics, & Drug Law Enforcement: An Analysis of Civil Asset
Forfeiture Patterns across US Counties, 19 POLICING & SOC’Y 1, 13–14 (2007); see Rulli, supra note 45, at
1140.
48
See also Rebecca Vallas et al., Forfeiting the American Dream: How Civil Asset Forfeiture
Exacerbates Hardship for Low-income Communities and Communities of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 5
(Apr. 2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/01060039/CivilAssetForfeiturereportv2.pdf. See generally Louis S. Rulli, supra note 45, at 1140.
49
Vallas et al., supra note 48, at 2.
50
11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2019).
51
Vallas et al., supra note 48, at 6; Joe Valenti, Millions of Americans are Outside the Financial System,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2014), https://cdn. americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ FDICfactsheet.pdf.
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a bank and carrying a month’s rent in cash can make an innocent individual
vulnerable to civil forfeiture. State and local law enforcement can have a seizure
placed under federal jurisdiction through civil forfeiture and keep up to eighty
percent of the proceeds from the seizure.52 The other twenty percent often goes
to federal agencies directly.53 The government and local agencies should be held
accountable for profiting off these vulnerabilities and should not be rewarded
with the ability to bypass creditors’ rights in bankruptcy proceedings.
Despite the obvious support for limiting civil forfeiture, its power still seems
stronger than ever. The fact that the automatic stay does not apply to civil
forfeiture because of the “police power exception” is evidence that the
government’s needs are prioritized over innocent owners and unsecured
creditors. However, should there really be a “police power” exception when civil
forfeiture is so widely criticized as simply “policing for profit,”54 and not truly
to deter criminal activity?
The Supreme Court supported the “policing for profit” argument by
acknowledging that the overuse of civil forfeiture as a source of income for the
State is “scarcely hypothetical.”55 Justice Ginsburg cited a previous Supreme
Court decision when noting that “fines are a source of revenue,” whereas other
types of punishment “cost a [s]tate money.”56 Therefore, governmental action
where the State stands to benefit, such as civil forfeiture, should be scrutinized
more closely.57
Justice Ginsburg furthers the argument that there should not be a police
power exception to the automatic stay when civil forfeiture is an excessive fine
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This should always be true when the
State is seeking to profit and not actually punish a guilty party. In a bankruptcy
proceeding, the property is used to pay off creditors before discharge of the
debtor’s debts. Therefore, allowing the property to remain property of the estate
does little to benefit the debtor who may be the wrongdoer, but removing the
property through forfeiture harms the innocent creditors.

52
53
54
55
56
57

Vallas, supra note 48, at 1.
Id.
See generally Carpenter, supra note 27 (surveying state laws).
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019).
Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.)).
Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.))
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B. The Importance of the Automatic Stay Determination
The importance of the automatic stay to the bankruptcy proceeding is
obvious in that all attempts to obtain possession of property that is property of
the estate are stayed, including litigation against the debtor or debtor’s property
in actions that arose pre-petition.58 The automatic stay allows for fair distribution
of a debtor’s assets, but also has other crucial implications when there is a
parallel civil forfeiture proceeding.
1. The Relation-Back Doctrine is Applicable Without the Automatic Stay
The court in In re Chapman recognized that the police power exception to
the automatic stay might cause the property to no longer be property of the
estate: “[T]he conflict here arises because of the relation-back doctrine and the
possibility that the Property, when all is said and done, may not be property of
the estate. However, if that happens, it is because that is the appropriate result
under the law.”59 The police power exception could cause the property to not be
property of the estate because the relation-back doctrine only applies after the
government has obtained a forfeiture judgment.60 The government can only
obtain the forfeiture judgment if the automatic stay does not enjoin it from doing
so. This means for the government to obtain a forfeiture judgment—and thus
have the relation-back doctrine be relevant—the police power exception must
apply.61
The relation-back doctrine, 21 U.S.C. Section 881(h), states that right, title,
and interest in forfeitable property “shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture . . . .”62 In other words, if the
government prevails in its forfeiture action, then its title relates back to the date
the crime was committed and not the date the government came into possession
of the property.63 Thus, the relation-back doctrine is the reason that debtors,

58

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2019).
United States v. Klein (In re Chapman), 264 B.R. 565, 572 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).
60
See id. at 569 (quoting United States. v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 129 (1993) (“the
Government cannot profit from the common-law doctrine of relation back until it has obtained a judgment of
forfeiture.”)).
61
Id. at 568.
62
21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (2018).
63
Craig Peyton Gaumer, When Two Worlds Collide: The Relationship and Conflicts Between Asset
Forfeiture and Bankruptcy Law, AM. BANKR. INST. (May 1, 2002), https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/when-twoworlds-collide-the-relationship-and-conflicts-between-asset-forfeiture-and#4; see also United States v. Stowell,
133 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1890).
59
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trustees, and creditors may only be able to challenge the forfeiture if both the
crime justifying the forfeiture and the forfeiture itself occurred post-petition.
The relation-back doctrine is problematic because it directly affects the
rights of innocent third parties. The relation-back doctrine effectively avoids “all
sales, alienations and other grants of property interests such as liens that arise
after the commission of the illegal act.”64 So, if a debtor purchases property with
illegally obtained funds, and a creditor acquires a security interest in that
property, the creditor’s security interest can be avoided by the forfeiture action.65
However, the Court in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue aimed to
provide a fair outcome in these situations.66 In that case, the respondent
purchased a house using approximately $240,000 from a significant other and
occupied it with her three children for years afterward.67 The government
believed the funds used to buy the house were proceeds of illegal drug
trafficking. The respondent claimed, however, she had no idea of the origin of
the funds and that she had separated from the man who gave her the funds.68 The
Court found the innocent owner defense succeeded over the relation-back
doctrine because, although her interest in the property occurred after the alleged
illegal act occurred, “[the government] cannot profit from the statutory version
of that [the relation-back] doctrine in § 881(h) until respondent has had the
chance to invoke and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense under
§ 881(a)(6).”69 Further, the Court also held that the innocent owner defense was
not limited to bona fide purchasers.70
However, Congress enacted a uniform innocent owner defense for civil
forfeiture in 2000 that superseded the decision regarding the bona fide purchaser
requirement in Buena Vista.71 The uniform innocent owner defense will be
discussed in detail later in this Comment, but for now, it is good law that the
relation-back doctrine does not defeat an innocent owner defense as in Buena
Vista. Therefore, if an innocent owner, whether it be a third-party owner or the
trustee itself, is able to assert the defense in relation to whether the police power
64
Myron M. Sheinfeld et al., Civil Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Conflicting Interests of the Debtor,
Its Creditors and the Government, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 93 (1995).
65
Id.
66
See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993). See generally United States v. 6124
Mary Lane Drive, No. 3:03CV580, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57172, at *6 (W.D.N.C. July 29, 2008) (explaining
that Congress superseded 92 Buena Vista Ave. by enacting CAFRA in 2000).
67
92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. at 115.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 129.
70
Id. at 123.
71
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2018); 6124 Mary Lane Drive, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57172, at *6.
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exception to the automatic stay applies at all, then the bankruptcy judge could
decide whether the relation-back doctrine applies at the same time as deciding if
the automatic stay applies.
2. Whether the Automatic Stay Applies Determines Whether the Bankruptcy
Court Has Exclusive Jurisdiction
After considering the relevance of the automatic stay to the relation-back
doctrine, it is necessary to understand how the automatic stay affects a
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the property. First, this Comment discusses
general jurisdictional issues that arise in parallel bankruptcy and forfeiture
proceedings. Then, this Comment explains how the bankruptcy court can retain
exclusive jurisdiction through the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court can
either retain exclusive jurisdiction or have concurrent jurisdiction with a civil
forfeiture proceeding.
a. Jurisdictional Issues–Generally
Courts do not easily give due regard to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over
property of the estate and often allow civil forfeiture actions to proceed in a nonbankruptcy forum.72 Some assert that bankruptcy courts should avoid a conflict
with a civil forfeiture proceeding through abstention or withdrawal.73 Courts
often use a bankruptcy court’s lack of jurisdiction as a reason to disallow
injunctions against the government in relation to a forfeiture.74
However, the timing of the bankruptcy petition and civil forfeiture is
important. The government sometimes allows a bankruptcy court to obtain
jurisdiction because it considers its objectives completed if the property is
already out of the hands of the debtor and being used to pay off innocent
creditors.75 In general, with criminal forfeiture, it would take significant action
from Congress for a bankruptcy court to be able to exercise jurisdiction over a
federal criminal case without violating Article III of the Constitution.76 The
answer to the question of jurisdiction is more clear in civil forfeiture proceedings
72

See Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 101.
See Michael S. Linscott, Comment, Asset Forfeiture (Modern Anti-Drug Weapon): Is Bankruptcy A
“Defense”?, 25 TULSA L.J. 617 (1990).
74
See In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Smouha, 136 B.R. 921, 928–
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
75
See United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (debtor filed a petition for relief and the
government relinquished its interest in the property to the bankruptcy trustee which had been obtained through
criminal forfeiture).
76
Gaumer, supra note 63.
73
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because Congress gave district courts the power to delegate civil proceedings to
bankruptcy courts.77
Section 1334 of the United States Code gives the district courts original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases occurring under the Bankruptcy Code.78 The
district courts can refer matters to the bankruptcy courts through Section 157:
“[A]ny or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.”79
Congress limited the authority to delegate to bankruptcy courts to “civil
proceedings,” and no provision allows delegation of criminal proceedings.80
Surely, a case where property is seized by the government under forfeiture,
that property is arguably part of the bankruptcy estate, and a trustee and creditors
have a third-party interest in that property, constitutes “any or all
proceedings . . . related to a case under title 11.” Additionally, there is some
authority for the idea that the case should proceed in the first court to exercise
jurisdiction over property. Thus the bankruptcy court should continue to exercise
jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding when the forfeiture is post-petition.81
Thus, when there is a post-petition civil forfeiture proceeding, the bankruptcy
court should retain jurisdiction first to determine whether the forfeiture is
legitimate and to allow for the trustee or creditor to assert its own defenses.
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) is an additional jurisdictional hurdle, which
gives original jurisdiction to the district courts over any “action or proceeding
for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise . . . .”82 Unlike Section 1334 of the United States Code, Section 1355
does not explicitly state that the district courts have “original but not exclusive
jurisdiction” of actions pertaining to forfeitures.83 Section 1355 does state that
the district courts have “original jurisdiction, exclusive to the States” over
matters pertaining to forfeiture.84 Therefore, Section 157 allowing the district
courts to delegate to the bankruptcy courts civil proceedings relating to title 11
may still apply to civil forfeitures.

77

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.”).
79
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2018).
80
Gaumer, supra note 63.
81
See Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2000) (“‘The court first assuming jurisdiction
over property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of another’ court . . . .”).
82
28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (2018).
83
See § 1355; 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2018).
84
§ 1355(a).
78
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b. How the Bankruptcy Court can Retain Exclusive Jurisdiction
In In re WinPar Hospitality Chattanooga, LLC, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee analyzed Section 1355
and its relation to a district court’s jurisdiction over property seized from the
estate through civil forfeiture.85 The trustee brought an action in the bankruptcy
court alleging that the United States violated the automatic stay when it brought
a civil forfeiture action against property of the estate in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida.86 The United States asserted the civil
forfeiture action post-petition, after a sale of the property to benefit creditors,
and claimed the property had been purchased with illegal proceeds from a
fraudulent scheme.87 The question presented to the bankruptcy court was
whether the forfeiture action violated the automatic stay.88 The court conducted
both the “pecuniary purpose” and “public policy”89 tests and determined that the
forfeiture action was an exception to the automatic stay as a police power under
§ 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.90
Additionally, the trustee argued that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the property in question because the bankruptcy court had
exclusive jurisdiction of the property of the estate.91 The court held that its
exclusive jurisdiction was dependent upon the applicability of the automatic
stay. If the automatic stay is not applicable, then the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction is concurrent with the district court.92 The court specifically noted
28 U.S.C. Section 1355(d) in allowing the district court to proceed in the in rem
civil forfeiture action without possession of the res: “[T]he district court’s

85
See Jahn v. United States (In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC), 401 B.R. 289, 294–95 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2009).
86
Id. at 291.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Both the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests are explained in great detail in the Analysis section
of this Comment.
90
In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC, 401 B.R. at 294.
91
Id.
92
Id. (citing Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 2001)):

[T]he exclusivity of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction reaches only as far as the automatic stay
provisions of 11 U.S.C.§ 362. That is, if the automatic stay applies to an action directed at the
debtor or its property, jurisdiction is exclusive in the bankruptcy court. If the automatic stay does
not apply–e.g., if an exception to the stay covers the action is question--the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of any other court of competent jurisdiction.
Chao, 270 F.3d at 383.

TEMPLEPROOFS_4.30.20

230

5/3/2020 4:29 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

jurisdiction does not depend on its initial possession of the res, for it now clearly
has the necessary jurisdiction to issue process to bring the res before it.”93
Based off the reasoning in WinPar Hospitality Chattanooga, LLC,
determining whether the bankruptcy court obtains exclusive jurisdiction over the
property turns on the question of whether or not the government’s forfeiture falls
within the police power exception to the automatic stay. Whether the forfeiture
falls within the police power exception to the automatic stay turns on whether
the “pecuniary purpose” and “public policy” tests are satisfied.
If the bankruptcy court obtains concurrent jurisdiction, rather than exclusive
jurisdiction, the issue then becomes whether the bankruptcy court’s decision will
hold over in the court with concurrent jurisdiction. The court in Chao v. Hospital
Staffing Servs., Inc. makes it clear that a bankruptcy court’s decision takes
priority over a state court’s: “If a state court and the bankruptcy court reach
differing conclusions as to whether the automatic stay bars maintenance of a suit
in the non-bankruptcy forum, the bankruptcy forum’s resolution has been held
determinative, presumably pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.”94 Administrative
proceedings before a federal agency would also be declared void ab initio if the
bankruptcy court found that the stay did apply. However, a conflict between a
district court and a bankruptcy court would need to be resolved by appeals from
both courts to an appellate court.
3. An Injunction Request on the Forfeiture Proceeding Without the
Automatic Stay is Inadequate
In a subsequent action, the trustee in WinPar Hospitality Chattanooga, LLC
continued to argue that the forfeiture proceeding in the district court should be
stayed because the district court did not have concurrent jurisdiction.95 The
trustee asserted that the court gave insufficient attention to the pecuniary purpose
and public policy tests.96 The court emphasized, again, that the stay did not apply
because of the Section 364(b) police power exception and therefore the district

93
28 U.S.C. 1355(d) (2018) (“Any court with jurisdiction over a forfeiture action pursuant to subsection
(b) may issue and cause to be served in any other district such process as may be required to bring before the
court the property that is the subject of the forfeiture action.”); In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC, 401 B.R
at 294.
94
Chao, 270 F.3d at 385 (citing Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Lai, 973 F.2d 1125, 1132 (3d Cir. 1992)
(reversing the Bankruptcy Court and holding that automatic stay did apply while also remanding with
instructions to vacate the judgment of the state court)).
95
In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC, 404 B.R. at 297.
96
Id. at 296.
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court did have concurrent jurisdiction to continue the forfeiture proceeding.97
The court continued to analyze the outcome as if the trustee asked for an
injunction on traditional grounds. According to the Supreme Court, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must establish:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.98

The court, applying this test, found that (1) the trustee could not be injured by
the proper operation of the federal judiciary; (2) had an adequate remedy
available as a claimant to the arrested property in the forfeiture action; (3) the
hardships weighed in favor of the district court because all of the forfeiture
witnesses were there; and (4) that public interest would be disserved by an
injunction because Congress’ intent behind the Section 362(b)(4) exception was
to combat the risk that criminals could seek refuge through bankruptcy law.99
The court made it clear that a forfeiture proceeding cannot be enjoined unless
the automatic stay applies. Therefore, trustees and creditors must focus their
argument around proving that the police power exception to the automatic stay
does not apply. If this battle is lost, the war is then much harder to win. The court
claimed that the trustee still has an adequate remedy at law under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 982(a)(6)(B) and 983(d),100 the innocent owner defenses for criminal and
civil forfeiture.101 The court explained that the trustee can argue that he is an
innocent owner due to his status as a bona fide purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 544
(a)(3). If he successfully persuades the district court he is the innocent owner,
he will recover the property for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.102 If he does
not successfully persuade the district court, the bankruptcy court reasoned this
is still an equitable result because the trustee still had his adequate day in
court.103
Despite the court’s justification that the innocent owner defense provides the
trustee with an adequate alternative in the forfeiture forum, it is more efficient
for the bankruptcy court to retain jurisdiction. This way, the bankruptcy court
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id. at 298 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
Id. at 298–300.
Id. at 298.
18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(6)(B), 983(d) (2018).
In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC, 404 B.R. at 298.
Id.
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can rule on the innocent owner defense while also deciding whether the
forfeiture was a proper police power and if the relation-back doctrine applies.
Additionally, the innocent owner defense is not an adequate alternative remedy
because the view that the “property is guilty” makes the defense difficult to
satisfy.
An injunction on traditional grounds is inadequate. Therefore, the
determination of whether the bankruptcy court retains exclusive jurisdiction
needs to be decided by the bankruptcy court as an initial step. The question turns
on whether the forfeiture is a police power exception, which turns on whether
the forfeiture is legitimate. Therefore, the trustee or creditors should be able to
assert necessary defenses to the forfeiture to prove its excessiveness, such as the
innocent owner and the excessive fines test, in this initial determination in the
bankruptcy court.
C. The Only Possible Expansions of the Property of the Estate by the Trustee
from the Bankruptcy Code
Since a bankruptcy court can still retain concurrent jurisdiction over the
questioned property, even if the automatic stay does not apply, it is necessary to
discuss a trustee’s possible arguments from the Bankruptcy Code.
There is little guidance in the case law regarding use of the Bankruptcy Code
as a defense in the civil forfeiture proceeding. Instead, there are ways the trustee
can expand the property of the estate. The Code provides three possible ways to
expand the property of the estate to include the forfeited property that are
relevant to the interplay between bankruptcy and civil forfeiture: (i) fraudulent
transfer; (ii) preferences; and (iii) avoidance. However, expansion of the
property of the estate only occurs when property was transferred pre-petition.
Therefore, these methods can only be used if (1) the court determines that the
automatic stay did not apply, and (2) title to the property was vested to the
government before the bankruptcy petition (possibly because of the relationback doctrine if the illegal act occurred pre-petition).
The success of applying fraudulent transfer, preferences, and avoidance to a
civil forfeiture is uncertain. This uncertainty is why a trustee should focus its
argument on the principle that an excessive forfeiture, or one where there is an
innocent owner, should not be considered a police power exception to the
automatic stay.
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1. Fraudulent Transfer
A trustee may avoid preferential or fraudulent transfers to creditors under
Sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.104 Section 548 may provide a
“potent weapon” for the trustee to retain property seized by the government.105
The Code provides that a trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest in debtor
property or any obligation incurred by the debtor if it was within two years
prepetition and the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation.106
Certainly, the government seizing a $42,000 truck, the situation in Timbs, is
not a transfer for a reasonably equivalent value.107 Therefore, the trustee may be
able to argue that the forfeiture is excessive in the bankruptcy court and the
bankruptcy court should avoid the transfer to the government.108 If a forfeiture
is “grossly disproportionate to the . . . offense,”109 then the forfeiture is not a
transfer for a “reasonably equivalent value.”
However, Section 548 only discusses transfers made within two years before
the filing for bankruptcy.110 Thus, the forfeiture (or at least the crime) would
have had to occur prepetition for the trustee to use this argument, which is why
the superior claim issue to the excessive fine and innocent owner defenses would
arise. The government would argue the property was never property of the estate
because the government’s title related back to the time of the crime and therefore
the trustee could not assert these defenses on behalf of the creditors.
The fraudulent transfer argument has not come up in cases involving civil
forfeiture, but it has been argued in foreclosure sales.111 In In re Coleman, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that a
foreclosure sale was a fraudulent transfer for less than a reasonably equivalent
value.112 However, in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., the Supreme Court held
that the price received at a properly conducted foreclosure sale constitutes

104

11 U.S.C. §§ 547–548 (2019).
See Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 110.
106
11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(A).
107
See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 122 & 129 (1993).
108
Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 112.
109
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 684 (2019) (holding that grossly disproportionate to the offense is
the established test for whether a fine is excessive).
110
§ 548.
111
See In re Coleman, 21 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982).
112
Id. at 837 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (emphasizing that seventy percent of market value is the threshold
for “reasonably equivalent value”).
105
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“reasonably equivalent value” under Section 548 of the Code.113 In such context,
a foreclosure sale could not be voided by a bankruptcy trustee as a fraudulent
transfer.114 The Court focused on the fact that the term “fair market value” is left
out of Section 548, yet it exists other places in the Code.115 The Court
emphasized that “the ‘reasonably equivalent value’ criterion will continue to
have independent meaning . . . outside the foreclosure context . . . . [and]
§ 548(a)(2)
will . . . continue
to
be
an
exclusive
means
of
invalidating . . . foreclosure sales . . . that, while not intentionally fraudulent,
nevertheless fail to comply with all governing state laws.”116
The theory compares well in the civil forfeiture world. Following the Court’s
reasoning in BFP, a civil forfeiture that is not “properly conducted” would not
constitute reasonably equivalent value. A forfeiture that is an unconstitutional
violation of the Eight Amendment Excessive Fines Clause cannot be considered
“properly conducted.” Therefore, an excessive forfeiture that is “grossly
disproportionate” to the gravity of the offense is for less than a reasonably
equivalent value and is not “properly conducted.” Thus, a trustee should be able
to avoid it under section 548 of the Code.
2. Preferences
Section 547 of the Code governs preferences. The provision allows for the
trustee to avoid any transfer of interest of the debtor in property:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an
antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)
made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made— (A) on or within 90
days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) between ninety
days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables
such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if— (A)
the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had
not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt
to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.117

113

Bfp v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 548 (1994).
See id.
115
Id. at 537 (quoting Chicago v. EDF, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)) (“It is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another.”).
116
Id. at 533.
117
11 U.S.C. § 547 (2019).
114
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The five requirements listed have to be satisfied in order for the trustee to argue
that a forfeiture can be avoided as a preferential transfer.
Regarding the first and second requirement, the government is a creditor
seizing property as an antecedent debt owed at the time the transfer was made.
The third and fourth requirements demand that the forfeiture be pre-petition and
that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the forfeiture. According to Section
101, “insolvent” means “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s
debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation . . . .”118 The
definition for insolvent excludes property that may be exempt from property of
the estate.119 In most cases where a forfeiture has resulted in a bankruptcy
petition, it is fair to assume that this factor will be satisfied. In fact, § 547(f)
assumes the element as well: “[T]he debtor is presumed to have been insolvent
on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition.”120
Now that the first four requirements have been established, the fifth
requirement would also be satisfied in parallel forfeiture and bankruptcy
proceedings. If not for the forfeiture allowing a transfer of interest in the
property, the United States would have received more than it would have under
chapter 7 of the Code. Section 726 of the Code lists forfeiture claims as fourth
priority.121 A claim by the government under Section 726(a)(4) is superior in
distribution priority only to post-petition interest and the debtor’s right to receive
any surplus.122 Congress intended that even unsecured creditors should be
protected from the debtor’s “wrongdoing.” The distribution priority signifies
that forfeitures were not meant to be able to seize assets which would have
otherwise been distributed to general creditors.123
An argument against this tactic may be that a forfeiture cannot be a
preferential transfer when it is not voluntary and the debtor did not initiate the
transfer of ownership interest. However, voluntariness is not a requirement of
118
119
120
121

11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2019).
§ 101(32)(A)(ii).
11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (2019).
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (2019):
[F]ourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty,
or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising before the earlier of the
order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or
damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim . . . .

122
123

§ 726.

§ 726.
See In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981); Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 112. See generally
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§ 547. In In re Veteran Plate Glass Company, a creditor obtained a prepetition
judgment against a debtor and, to satisfy the judgment, a writ of execution
against the debtor’s pickup-truck, printer, and computer.124 The debtor then filed
a chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy and the trustee argued that the creditor had
no lien interest in the property.125 The trustee also asserted that if the creditor
did have an interest in the property due to the seizure pursuant to the writ of
execution, that interest was subject to avoidance as a preference under Section
547.126 The court ultimately held that the creditor did have a lien interest based
on state law, but that is was avoidable as a preference under Section 547 based
on the elements set forth in the Code.127
The court in Veteran Plate Glass Company concluded that “there is no doubt
that the obtaining of a lien interest by seizure, pursuant to a writ of execution
constitutes a ‘transfer of an interest of the debtor in property’ for purposes of the
preference provision.”128 The court reasoned that allowing the creditor to be
placed in a better position than other unsecured creditors defeats the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code by undermining the equality of distribution among
creditors in the same class.129 A seizure under civil forfeiture has the same effect
as a writ of execution and therefore should be avoided to protect other creditors
as well.
Additionally, the defendant in In re Kayajanian argued against the avoidance
of its nondischargeable claim based on a restitution payment that was part of the
debtor’s probation agreement with a criminal court.130 The only element at issue
was whether the transfer enabled the defendant to receive more than it would
from the estate in a chapter 7 liquidation distribution.131 The defendant argued
that it should receive payment in full outside of the estate because its claim was
nondischargeable in chapter 7 and therefore the element was satisfied.132
However, the court found that just because a nondischargeable debt may be paid
outside the estate after bankruptcy, that does not create a priority inconsistent
with that of a chapter 7 distribution of the estate.133

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

In re Veteran Plate Glass Co., 71 B.R. 74, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75–76.
In re Veteran Plate Glass Co., 71 B.R. at 76.
Id.
In re Kayajanian, 27 B.R. 711, 712 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.

TEMPLEPROOFS_4.30.20

2020]

5/3/2020 4:29 PM

POLICING FOR PROFIT

237

If the court applied this rationale and avoided the restitution payment to a
criminal court as preference, surely it can be extended to a similar theory of civil
forfeiture. The government’s claim of forfeiture is not dischargeable under
Section 523(a)(7) “to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation
for actual pecuniary loss . . . .”134 However, based on Kayajanian, the fact that
the forfeiture claim is nondischargeable does not affect the trustee’s ability to
avoid it under Section 527.
3. Section 724 Treatment of Liens
Section 724 of the Code specifically states that “the trustee may avoid a lien
that secures a claim of a kind specified in section 726(a)(4).”135 Section
726(a)(4) includes “any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary,
or punitive damages . . . to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or
damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder
of such claim . . . .”136 The decision in Austin declaring civil forfeitures to be
punitive is thus again relevant.137 An excessive forfeiture—one clearly not for
compensation or actual pecuniary loss suffered—would qualify as a claim of a
kind specified in Section 726(a)(4). Thus, the trustee could avoid the
government’s lien under Section 724. The court in Rice v. United States
specifically stated that the purpose of the trustee’s avoidance power under
Section 724(a) is to protect unsecured creditors from the debtor’s
wrongdoings.138
The court connects § 724 and § 726 by stating that unsecured creditors
benefit from the trustee’s avoidance of forfeitures under § 724 because they
would be paid under the distribution scheme required by § 726.139 Essentially, it
is evident that § 724 was enacted so that § 726(a)(4) claims, such as civil
forfeiture claims, cannot bypass general creditors and receive first priority. It is
inefficient and illogical to allow a civil forfeiture proceeding to be conducted,
only to then force the trustee to join the government as a party in the bankruptcy
proceeding to litigate the issue of excessiveness and determine that the forfeiture
was punitive so that the lien can be avoided. The bankruptcy court should retain

134

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2019).
11 U.S.C. § 724(a) (2019).
136
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (2019).
137
See generally Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
138
Rice v. United States (In re Odom Antennas, Inc.), 258 B.R. 376, 384 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001), aff’d,
In re Odom Antennas, Inc., 340 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 2003).
139
Id.
135
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jurisdiction at the start of the proceeding in order to determine the legitimacy of
the forfeiture and proper distribution of proceeds of the property of the estate.
II. ANALYSIS
The police power exception to the automatic stay does not apply if the
pecuniary purpose and public policy tests are not satisfied.140 If the police power
exception does not apply, then the forfeiture proceeding is stayed and the
bankruptcy proceeding continues. Creditors are protected from the debtor’s
wrongdoing and the forfeiture claim is paid according to the priority listed in the
Bankruptcy Code. Public policy against the power of civil forfeiture endorses
this result.
First, this section analyzes why creditor protection in the bankruptcy
proceeding is critical—because, with the current state of the law, seeking an
equitable remedy outside of bankruptcy is inadequate. Second, this section
explains the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests in detail while analyzing
the police power exception to the automatic stay.
Since an equitable remedy with the Department of Justice is inadequate, the
determination that the automatic stay applies to a forfeiture proceeding is crucial.
The defenses recognized in the civil forfeiture forum are discussed and their
relevance to the determination of automatic stay question becomes clear. The
innocent owner defense and excessive fines analysis are determinative in
whether the forfeiture qualifies as a “police power” exception to the automatic
stay. Therefore, they must be considered by the bankruptcy court while it
conducts the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests.
A. Seeking an Equitable Remedy from the Department of Justice is Inadequate
In addition to the public support for limiting civil forfeiture, another reason
that a creditor needs additional protections in the context of parallel bankruptcy
and forfeiture proceedings is that seeking an equitable remedy from the
Department of Justice is often inadequate.
Without the knowledge of a trustee and protection of a bankruptcy
proceeding, a creditor’s options are limited. Currently, civil forfeiture law itself
has two options for handling claims of third parties that were affected by a
forfeiture: (1) “innocent owners” may file a proof of claim with the district court

140

United States v. Klein (In re Chapman), 264 B.R. 565, 569 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).
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or (2) seek an equitable remedy from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).141 If
the district court does not accept the innocent owner defense, and the creditor is
forced to seek an equitable remedy by filing a petition for remission, the
government has complete discretion in deciding how to distribute the assets from
a civil forfeiture to creditors.142 Unsecured creditors do not have a legally
recognized claim, and therefore cannot assert the innocent owner defense.143 So,
unsecured creditors have to rely on filing a petition for remission. If the Attorney
General decides not to remit the forfeiture and pay creditors, the district court
does not have jurisdiction to review that decision.144 Therefore, the DOJ, the
very organization benefiting from distributing the assets of a forfeiture to
creditors, receives unreviewable authority.
The fact that 18 U.S.C. Section 981(d) gives the Attorney General sole
discretion in deciding how, if at all, to allocate forfeited assets to creditors
effectively replaces bankruptcy law and its purposes.145 Since the decision is not
reviewable by the district court, creditors may be hesitant to challenge the
forfeiture on constitutional grounds from the beginning. A creditor, if not
successful in the litigation, would have upset the very people it then must ask to
pay it its equitable interest.146
Civil forfeiture, unlike bankruptcy, does not require similarly situated
creditors to be equally paid back. The discretion given to the Attorney General
therefore undermines the policy of bankruptcy law. Thus, creditors need the
bankruptcy courts as an avenue to protect themselves. If the bankruptcy courts
cannot retain exclusive jurisdiction through the automatic stay and the forfeiture
proceeds, then a potential solution is that the Attorney General should at least be
accountable to the bankruptcy court when distributing the assets from the
forfeiture. If the Attorney General was required to work with the trustee in the
distribution of the forfeited assets, then at least some of bankruptcy’s goal of
fairness to creditors would be achieved in the process.

141
Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 287 (1993).
142
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall have sole responsibility for disposing
of petitions for remission or mitigation with respect to property involved in a judicial forfeiture proceeding.”).
143
Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 287.
144
See United States v. Parcel of Land, 791 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (citing United States
v. One 1970 Buick, 463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1972)).
145
§ 981(d).
146
See generally Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 287.
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B. Determining Whether the Automatic Stay Applies
The main question in parallel bankruptcy and civil forfeiture proceedings is
whether the property forfeited was, or can be, property of the estate.147 The
question is also the main focus of this Comment—whether the automatic stay
should apply when forfeiture is increasingly considered excessive and outside
of what is considered a “police power.”
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) states that all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property become property of the estate at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case.148 It is well established that the debtor
cannot use bankruptcy as a defense to pre-petition forfeiture because, due to the
property already being subject to forfeiture, the debtor has no interest in the
property at the commencement of the bankruptcy case.149 Because this Comment
already discussed the methods to expand the property of the estate to include the
pre-petition transfer, this Section focuses on post-petition forfeiture. In postpetition forfeiture, a debtor declares bankruptcy before the property is subject to
forfeiture.150 Therefore, the property is already property of the estate when the
government tries to assert a right over it through civil forfeiture.
Section 362(a) of the Code provides that all attempts to obtain possession of
property that is property of the estate are stayed.151 This includes litigation
against the debtor or debtor’s property in actions that arose pre-petition.152
Reading the Code, it seems apparent that forfeiture actions that occur postpetition should be stayed until the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding.
However, Section 362(b)(4) grants a police power exception to the automatic
stay.153 Forfeiture proceedings are allowed to proceed and are exempt from the
automatic stay because of the police power exception.154
The legislative history of Section 362(b) shows that bankruptcy laws are not
meant to be a haven for criminal offenders.155 Congress’s intent behind the
police power exception was to bar criminal offenders from using bankruptcy as
147

Gaumer, supra note 63.
11 U.S.C § 541(a) (2019).
149
Gaumer, supra note 63.
150
Gaumer, supra note 63.
151
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2019).
152
Id.
153
§ 362(b)(4).
154
In re Goff, 159 B.R. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993); see also United States v. Klein (In re Chapman),
264 B.R. 565, 573 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001).
155
See Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 112 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 342,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837, 6299).
148
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an escape of consequences for their actions by allowing criminal actions and
proceedings to continue in spite of an ongoing bankruptcy case.156 However, this
intent does not explain why the police power exception applies to civil
forfeitures as well as criminal forfeitures, and especially pre-conviction civil
forfeiture. It seems unclear why innocent owners157 in a civil forfeiture
proceeding should be punished under an exception that was drafted to affect
criminals themselves.
In In re Chapman, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
directly answered the question regarding how the police power exception to the
automatic stay relates to civil forfeitures.158 The debtor’s home was subject to a
civil forfeiture action because the government alleged it was used for the
manufacture and distribution of marijuana.159 The debtor filed for chapter 7
bankruptcy before there was a ruling on the action, and the court found that the
action was excepted from the automatic stay under the police power
exception.160 The government used the relation-back doctrine to argue that the
property should have never been property of the estate. Thus, the main issue was
whether the automatic stay applied. The court identified two tests for
determining when the police power exception to the stay applies in a proceeding:
(1) the pecuniary purpose test and (2) the public policy test.161
The two tests from Chapman are independent of one another and the
government can succeed if it satisfies either test.162 The pecuniary purpose test
analyzes whether the government acted primarily to protect its “pecuniary
interest” in the debtor’s property or acted to protect public safety and welfare.
The public policy test determines whether the government’s actions were
motivated to effectuate public policy or private rights.163 Effectuating public
policy is under the police power exception to the automatic stay, while other
motivations, such as pecuniary interests, are not.
156
See Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 112 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 342,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837, 6299). See also In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 297 (6th
Cir. 1988); Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Co. Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 700 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.
1983).
157
See, e.g., Iowa Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUSTICE (2014), https://ij.org/case/iowa-forfeiture/ (Restaurant
owner only accepted cash, meaning she made frequent trips to the bank to keep the money safe, government
seized her entire bank account claiming she was “structuring” her deposits to be less than $10,000).
158
See United States v. Klein (In re Chapman), 264 B.R. 565, 572 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).
159
Id. at 567.
160
In re Chapman, 264 B.R. at 567.
161
Id. at 569.
162
Id.
163
Id. (citing Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re Universal Life Church, Inc.), 128 F.3d
1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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1. The Pecuniary Purpose Test
The court in Chapman found that the pecuniary purpose test was satisfied
because “the government’s primary motive [was] to punish [d]ebtor and enforce
a policy that is meant to deter not only [d]ebtor but others who might be tempted
to traffic in illegal drugs.”164 The court emphasized that even though the
government will ultimately receive a pecuniary reward, that does not change the
primary purpose behind the forfeiture provisions.165 The purpose is to “punish
and deter offenders rather than to compensate and reward the government for
pursuing the [p]roperty.”166
If the owner of the house was a truly innocent owner, the government could
not satisfy the pecuniary purpose test. If a third party was merely renting the
house to the Chapmans when it was seized because there was marijuana on the
premises, how could the government justify punishing the innocent owner under
the pecuniary test? Nevertheless, since the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, forfeiture has largely gone unchecked
even in the face of constitutional challenges.167
However, in this hypothetical the third-party lessor could assert an Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines argument to prove the government’s purpose was
to protect its pecuniary interest.168 A property owner’s negligence in approving
lessees should not justify the seizure of that property.
Further, this reasoning also extends to entirely separate third-parties. How
can the government satisfy the pecuniary purpose test when a trustee brings an
innocent owner defense on behalf of secured creditors? The secured creditor
likely has no real knowledge of what activities the lessor engages in on the rented
property or even who the property was rented to, so they should not be culpable.
Thus, since trustees and secured creditors are both “owners” according to the
general rules of civil forfeiture and the Bankruptcy Code,169 the creditors in the
bankruptcy proceeding can use the excessive fine argument to prove that the
government cannot satisfy the pecuniary purpose test. The trustee should have

164

Id. at 570.
Id. (describing the purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 881, which is the provision allowing for forfeitures).
166
Id.
167
Calero v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (holding that forfeiture of an innocent
lessor’s interest in a yacht, due to the presence of two marijuana cigarettes, did not violate due process).
168
See United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the proper focus of the
excessiveness inquiry is the owner affected by the fine, not just the defendant who committed the crime).
169
See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2019); 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(A) (2018).
165
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the ability to assert the Excessive Fines defense in the bankruptcy forum when
parties are litigating the police power exception to the automatic stay.
2. The Public Policy Test
Additionally, the public policy test in Chapman was also satisfied because
“the government [was] not seeking through the [a]ction to litigate private rights.
Instead . . . the government’s primary motive . . . [was] to protect the public
welfare from the ravages of illegal drugs.”170 Yet, ignoring the private rights of
innocent third parties, secured and unsecured creditors, is essentially litigating
the private rights. If there is an innocent debtor and innocent creditors, like in
the proposed hypothetical, then how can the court justify the government’s
purpose as weighted heavier than private rights? The reasoning shows why the
trustee should be able to assert the innocent owner defense at the time these tests
are being conducted by the bankruptcy judge so that the property is never taken
out of the estate as an exception to the stay.
3. Additional Interpretations of the Pecuniary Purpose and Public Policy
Tests
The Goff court, in a case before Chapman, noted the importance of the
Supreme Court’s excessive punishment analysis in Austin.171 The court held that
“[t]o the extent that such forfeitures are punitive, they are directed ostensibly
against premises and things, but are aimed primarily at particular people who
own those premises and things, and who can be made to suffer by taking the
property away from them.”172 The court also stated that, when forfeitures are
acquisitive, “they are concerned with neither the use of a thing nor the
sensibilities of its owner, but are merely an opportunistic grab at value.”173
Many forfeiture cases exist where the forfeiture can only be described as an
intent to punish the debtor or to make money for a government agency and not
an exercise of police or regulatory power. The Goff court concluded that purely
punitive forfeitures are not excepted from the automatic stay under
§ 362(b)(4).174 Remedial forfeiture actions would be allowed to proceed under
the police power exception, but punitive forfeitures would not be. The Goff
170

In re Chapman, 264 B.R. at 570.
See Goff v. Okla. (In re Goff), 159 B.R. 33, 40 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993) (emphasizing the decision in
Austin v. United States that civil forfeitures are punitive and are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment).
172
In re Goff, 159 B.R. at 40.
173
Id.
174
Id.
171
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analysis, contrary to Chapman, should control where excessive forfeitures cause
innocent creditors to suffer from the government seizing property that otherwise
would have been property of the estate. Again, this determination should be in
the bankruptcy court.
The court in WinPar Hospitality Chattanooga, LLC175 found that a forfeiture
action was a police power exception because its purpose was “namely the
punishment of a criminal and the deterrence of others who might be like minded”
and was so “closely correlated to and dependent on serious criminal activity.”176
This is distinguishable from the case where a forfeiture action is excessive,
“grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense” and “merely an
opportunistic grab at value.”
Further, the Court in Chao v. Hospital Staffing Servivces, Inc. also gives us
additional insight into the “pecuniary interest” and “public policy” tests by
explaining that they “are designed to sort out cases in which the government is
bringing suit in furtherance of either its own or certain private parties’ interest
in obtaining a pecuniary advantage over other creditors.”177 The Court also
followed precedent and refined the “pecuniary interest” test to specifically
inquire “whether the action ‘would result in a pecuniary advantage to the
government vis-a-vis other creditors of the debtor’s estate.’”178 The Court
explained that the limitation on the scope of the police power exception follows
Congress’s intent to not extend the exception for the enforcement of a money
judgment:
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control
of the bankruptcy court, and . . . constitute a fund out of which
all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a
governmental unit of a money judgment would give it
preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.179
With proof that most of the proceeds from a civil forfeiture go directly to the
enforcement agencies and help the government pay off debts, allowing an

175
176

Discussed previously in the Jurisdiction section.
Jahn v. United States (In re WinPar Hosp. Chattanooga, LLC), 401 B.R. 289, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

2009).
177

Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Id. at 386; see also In re Commonwealth Cos., 913 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 1990) (defining the
pecuniary purpose test as whether the “specific acts the government wishes to carry out . . . would result in an
economic advantage to the government or its citizens over third parties in relation to the debtor’s estate.”)
(quoting Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 42 Bankr. 380, 382 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984)).
179
In re Commonwealth Cos., 913 F.2d at 523 (citing S. Rep. No. 989 at 52; H.R. Rep. No. 595 at 343).
178
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exception to the automatic stay would result in a pecuniary advantage to the
government “or its citizens” over third parties in the bankruptcy proceeding.180
If civil forfeiture power continues to be generally unlimited, then creditors need
protection from the government’s use of the police power exception to gain an
advantage in a bankruptcy proceeding.
C. Defenses Recognized in the Civil Forfeiture Forum and How They Should
be Used to Defeat the Police Power Exception
The innocent owner defense and the Excessive Fines Clause are both
recognized defenses to a civil forfeiture. Both of these defenses are even more
relevant in a parallel bankruptcy proceeding. Before discussing the defenses, it
is necessary to analyze who would have standing to assert them outside of
bankruptcy. This will help to understand why asserting them in the civil
forfeiture forum is less favorable to creditors than asserting them in the
automatic stay analysis.
1. Standing to Challenge the Forfeiture Outside of the Bankruptcy
Proceeding
It is essential to consider who has standing to challenge a civil forfeiture
action in the non-bankruptcy forum because a party in the bankruptcy
proceeding may only challenge a seizure in the forfeiture proceeding if it has
standing to do so in that court.
a. Unsecured Creditors
A claimant to property in an in rem civil forfeiture action bears the burden
of establishing it has standing to assert his claim.181 Generally, showing standing
only requires the claimant to follow procedures for asserting its claim and
alleging a “facially colorable interest” in the property.182

180
See id. (defining the pecuniary purpose test as whether the “specific acts the government wishes to
carry out . . . would result in an economic advantage to the government or its citizens over third parties in relation
to the debtor’s estate.”) (quoting Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 42 Bankr. 380, 382 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984)).
181
Hon. Steven Rhodes, The Battle Over Forfeited Assets When a Bankruptcy Case Is Pending, THE PONZI
BOOK: A LEGAL RESOURCE FOR UNRAVELING PONZI SCHEMES 9 (Kathy Bazoian Phelps & Hon. Steven Rhodes,
2012); see, e.g., United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008).
182
See also United States v. 2004 Ferrari 360 Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d 944, 951 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing
U.S. States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 1998)). See generally Rhodes, supra note 181, at 10.
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Unsecured creditors specifically do not have standing to contest a civil
forfeiture. 183 In contrast, Article III standing simply requires an actual case
or controversy,184 and statutory standing just requires meeting the statutory
requirements. 185 The rule is premised on the idea that unsecured creditors
cannot assert an interest in any specific asset and therefore do not have a
recognizable interest in the property involved in the proceeding.186 Courts
insist that the definition of “owner” under the innocent owner defense has
nothing to do with the standing inquiry.187 However, at the same time,
Congress specifically did not list unsecured creditors as an “owner” for the
innocent owner defense under the general rules for civil forfeiture
proceedings.188 Courts cite to Congress’s intent to not allow unsecured
creditors an innocent owner defense under 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) as the reason
for denying them standing to challenge the civil forfeiture.189
b. Trustees and Secured Creditors
Trustees and secured creditors are different than unsecured creditors. Courts
repeatedly suggests that Article III standing to challenge a forfeiture or having a
facially colorable interest is not difficult to achieve.190 Statutory standing simply
requires following the steps in 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2) and Rule G(5)(a), it has
nothing to do with what constitutes an owner according to § 983(d).191 However,
the fact that a trustee and secured creditor are owners under § 983(d) furthers the
183
See, e.g., United States v. 6124 Mary Lane Drive, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64073, at * 8 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 20, 2008) (finding that “Congress has precluded application of the criminal forfeiture holding . . . that in
some circumstances a general unsecured creditor may have a legal ownership interest in specific property” from
civil forfeiture proceedings); see Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 954; see also United States v. $47,875.00 in U.S.
Currency, 746 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
184
Rhodes, supra note 181, at 10.
185
See, e.g., Mary Lane Drive, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64073, at * 8 (finding that “Congress has precluded
application of the criminal forfeiture holding . . . that in some circumstances a general unsecured creditor may
have a legal ownership interest in specific property” from civil forfeiture proceedings); see Modeno, 902 F.
Supp. 2d at 954; see also $47,875.00, 746 F.2d at 293.
186
See Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
187
Rhodes, supra note 181, at 11–12 (citing United States v. Assets Described in “Attachment A” to the
Verified Complaint Forfeiture in Rem, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2011)).
188
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(B)(i) (2018).
189
See, e.g., United States v. One Hundred Thirty-Three U.S. Postal Serv. Money Orders Totaling
$127,479.24, 780, F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (D. Haw. 2011); see Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(“Under section 983, an unsecured general creditor does not have standing to contest forfeiture.”) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A) (2018) (describing who constitutes an owner for the purposes of the innocent owner
defense)).
190
See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Money Orders, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; United States v. Assets Described
in “Attachment A” to the Verified Complaint Forfeiture In Rem, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
191
Rhodes, supra note 181, at 12 (citing United States v. Assets Described in “Attachment A” to the
Verified Complaint Forfeiture in Rem, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2011)).
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argument that they both have a “facially colorable interest,” and therefore have
Article III standing. “Owner” includes someone with an “ownership interest in
the specific property sought to be forfeited, including a leasehold, lien,
mortgage, recorded security interest, or valid assignment of an ownership
interest . . . .”192 Additionally, § 544 of the Code states that the trustee in a
bankruptcy proceeding acts as a lien creditor and as a bona fide purchaser of real
property of the debtor.193 Therefore, trustees and secured creditors are owners
within the general terms of civil forfeiture proceedings. An owner has an interest
in the property, and therefore satisfies Article III standing.
It makes sense that both trustees and secured creditors would likely have
standing to challenge a forfeiture, as they have an actual interest in the property.
However, barring unsecured creditors from challenging the forfeiture can be
unfair. Unsecured creditors are, perhaps, most affected by the forfeiture since
their priority will be lower than both the government’s and the secured creditor’s
priority if the forfeiture is allowed. Therefore, the unsecured creditors are the
most likely to not get paid when the government profits from a civil forfeiture.
Unsecured creditors need the extra procedural protections of a bankruptcy forum
to assert potential arguments.
2. Innocent Owner Defense
Due to the fact that civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding brought against
“guilty property,” the property of the estate in bankruptcy could be subject to
forfeiture even if the debtor has not done anything illegal.194 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)
describes the innocent owner defense for civil forfeiture proceedings.195
Through the CAFRA legislation in 2000, Congress made it clear that the
innocent owner defense would not defeat the relation-back doctrine unless the
third party could satisfy either paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) of Section
983(d).196 The burden is on the claimant to prove that it satisfies one of these
paragraphs as an innocent owner.197 Paragraph (2) describes property interests
that were already in existence at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to the

192

18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(A) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 544 (a)(3) (2019).
194
Sheinfeld, supra note 64, at 112.
195
18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
196
See United States v. 6124 Mary Lane Drive, No. 3:03CV580, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57172, at *6–7
(W.D.N.C. July 29, 2008).
197
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
193
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forfeiture occurred, while paragraph (3) allows for an innocent owner defense
for a property interest acquired after the illegal conduct occurred.198
The requirements if the owner had an interest in the property before the
illegal activity are that the owner “(i) did not know of the conduct giving rise to
forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did
all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such
use of the property.”199
The requirements if the owner acquired a property interest after the conduct
giving rise to the forfeiture occurred are that the owner “(i) was a bona fide
purchaser or seller for value (including a purchaser or seller of goods or services
for value); and (ii) did not know and was reasonably without cause to believe
that the property was subject to forfeiture.”200 The statute therefore overrules the
Court in Buena Vista by requiring the “innocent owner” be a bona fide purchaser
if the property interest was acquired after the illegal act took place.
The innocent owner defense is relevant to bankruptcy law because, as
previously mentioned, Section 544 of the Code states that the trustee in a
bankruptcy proceeding acts as a lien creditor and as a bona fide purchaser.201
Also, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6) states that the term “owner” includes “a person with
an ownership interest in the specific property sought to be forfeited, including a
leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, or valid assignment of an
ownership interest . . . .”202 However, the term “owner” does not include “a
person with only a general unsecured interest in, or claim against, the property
or estate of another . . . .”203 Consequently, assuming unsecured creditors would
have standing, they are not able to assert an innocent owner defense in a civil
forfeiture proceeding because they are not considered “owners” under the
relevant statute. Unsecured creditors need the procedural protections of the
bankruptcy code in order to have their interests protected.
Courts have made it clear that creditors and trustees may not challenge
criminal forfeiture proceedings except when in the context of ancillary
proceedings.204 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) describes ancillary proceedings:

198

See § 983(d)(2)–(3).
§ 983(d)(2).
200
§ 983(d)(3).
201
See Rhodes, supra note 181; see also 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2019).
202
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(A) (2018).
203
See § 983(d)(6)(B).
204
See, e.g., United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 648 (9th Cir. 2007); Alice W. Dery, Interplay
between Forfeiture and Bankruptcy, 66 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 117, 121–22 (2018) (citing United States v. Cambio
199
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Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in
property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States
pursuant to this section may, within thirty days of the final publication
of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph (1), whichever is
earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his
alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held before the
court alone, without a jury.205

However, civil forfeiture does not have that limitation.206 The property is the
defendant in an in rem case. So, the court with jurisdiction over the property
becomes the exclusive forum for litigating any rights to the property. A problem
does arise under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(4)(C) because it provides that the taken
property shall be deemed to be in the custody of the government until the district
court decides otherwise.207 That could mean a third party would have to assert
their interest in the property to the district court. Therefore, Congress should
take action to ensure that, while the legitimacy of the forfeiture is being
determined, trustees and creditors can assert their defenses to the post-petition
forfeiture in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Additionally, it is important for the trustee and creditors that the forfeiture
be a civil forfeiture if the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture occurred before
the trustee or creditors established their interest in the property. It is important
because the innocent owner defense statute for a civil forfeiture, unlike a
criminal forfeiture, does not require that the owner acquired the property for
value if the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture occurred after the third party
established its interest.208
The problem with the innocent owner defense is that a claimant’s innocence
may not defeat a civil forfeiture action because the action is against the property
and thus the property is deemed guilty.209 The theory that the owner may be held
accountable for the wrongs of who he trusts with his property is often used to
deny the innocent owner defense.210 The theory suggests that forfeiture is the
owner’s punishment for negligently allowing the misuse of his property.211

Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1999)).
205
18 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2).
206
See generally Dery, supra note 204, at 117.
207
§ 981(c) (“Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed
to be in the custody of the Attorney General [or] the Secretary of the Treasury . . . subject only to the orders and
decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction thereof.”).
208
See Dery, supra note 204, at 117, 120.
209
See Linscott, supra note 73, at 623.
210
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617 (1993).
211
Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
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Given the difficulty of the innocent owner defense, the Excessive Fines
argument is an important alternative.
3. Excessive Fines Clause
A property owner can use an Excessive Fines argument to avoid the
forfeiture. The amendments to civil forfeiture law under CAFRA incorporate
guidelines to review a forfeiture for proportionality.212 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(1)
states that a claimant may petition the court “to determine whether the forfeiture
was constitutionally excessive.”213 If the forfeiture is not proportional to the
“gravity of the offense,” then the court shall either reduce or eliminate the
forfeiture.214
a. Determining the Test for Whether a Forfeiture Is “Excessive”
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”215 The Excessive Fines Clause has been interpreted to
mean that excessive fines shall not be imposed.216 Austin v. United States was
one of the first cases to limit forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment.217 In
Austin, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeitures are a form of punishment
and subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.218 The Court reasoned that “even
assuming that [civil forfeiture statutes] serve some remedial purpose . . . ‘[A]
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.’”219 However,
the Court left the test for determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally
“excessive” for consideration in the lower courts.220 After the Austin decision,
the lower courts developed three different tests to determine whether a forfeiture

212

United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012).
18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(1) (2018).
214
§§ 983(g)(2)–(4).
215
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
216
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019); Melissa A. Rolland, Forfeiture Law, the Eight
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and Unites States v. Bajakajian, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1371, 1383
(1999).
217
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993); Rolland, supra note 216, at 1383.
218
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
219
Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448–450 (1989))
220
Id. at 622–23.
213
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is an excessive fine: (1) the instrumentality test; (2) the proportionality test; and
(3) a hybrid test.221
First, the instrumentality test states that “the property forfeited must have a
close enough relationship to the crime that the property is deemed an
instrumentality of the crime . . . .”222 However, the majority in Austin did not
entirely agree with Scalia’s instrumentality test by not limiting the lower courts
to that single factor.223
Second, the proportionality test looks at: (1) the gravity of the offense in
comparison to the harshness of the punishment; (2) the punishment imposed
compared to the punishment for other crimes of a similar gravity; and (3) the
punishment given compared to the punishment for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.224
Lastly, the hybrid test looks at both the relationship of the property to the
crime and the gravity of the offense in comparison to the harshness of the
forfeiture.225 The hybrid test, which was applied by the Ninth Circuit, was
reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v.
Bajakajian.226 The Supreme Court held that the instrumentality portion of the
hybrid test was not necessary because the forfeiture was a fine where the
government sought to punish the individual.227 Therefore, the test for
excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture only involves a proportionality
determination.228 The Court held in Bajakajian that a punitive forfeiture violates
the Excessive Fines Clause “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a
defendant’s offense.”229 The Court cited to Austin to determine the appropriate
test is the proportionality test, indicating that the test for a “punitive” forfeiture
still applies to both civil and criminal forfeitures.230
221

Rolland, supra note 216, at 1385.
Id.; see Austin, 509 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the offense.”).
223
Melissa A. Rolland, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and Unites States
v. Bajakajian, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1371, 1385 (1999).
224
Id. at 1386; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 278 (1983); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 1001 (1991).
225
Melissa A. Rolland, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and Unites States
v. Bajakajian, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1371, 1388 (1999); see United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d
974, 983 (9th Cir. 1995).
226
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998) (forfeiture case where the respondent failed to
report that he was attempting to leave the United States with more than $10,000 in cash on him).
227
Id. 333–34.
228
Id. at 334.
229
Id.
230
Id.; see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993); see also Alexander v. United States, 509
222
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Finally, in Bajakajian, the Court analyzed the level of the respondent’s
culpability and the harm that the respondent caused in determining that the
forfeiture was excessive and “grossly disproportional” to the offense.231 Thus,
the decision from the Supreme Court in Bajakajian clarified that the
instrumentality and hybrid tests were not necessary as the proportionality test
was the proper inquiry when determining whether a forfeiture is excessive.
The majority of courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bajakajian narrowly to mean that, “as long as a penalty is not grossly
disproportionate in relation to its associated offense, it is not barred by the Eighth
Amendment.”232 These courts have all devised a similar set of factors for
determining what “grossly disproportional means.”233 The set of factors
includes: (1) the essence of the crime of the defendant and its relation to other
criminal activity; (2) whether the defendant fits into the class of persons for
whom the statute was principally designed; (3) the maximum sentence and fine
that could have been imposed; and (4) the nature of the harm caused by the
defendant’s conduct.234 However, the Court in Bajakajian did not mandate the
consideration of any rigid set of factors.235
Therefore, other courts, such as the First Circuit, have required courts to
consider an additional factor: whether the fine or forfeiture would be so severe
as to destroy a defendant’s livelihood.236 There are three main arguments that
support considering ability, or inability, to pay as an additional factor. First, the
Supreme Court in Bajakajian found that the forfeiture was grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense because the government seized
such a large amount of money for the minor offense of not reporting the
money.237 Therefore, the Court did not need to analyze any other factors such as
the defendant’s income or livelihood. Second, the defendant’s financial ability
is considered in other parts of the Eighth Amendment, such as the Excessive

U.S. 544, 559 (1993).
231
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337.
232
Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines
Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 834 (2013).
233
United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
234
Id. (“Four factors, distilled from Bajakajian, guide our analysis . . . . To see how these factors work, it
is useful to consider the Supreme Court’s approach in Bajakajian.”); United States v. Varrone, 554 F.3d 327,
331 (2d Cir. 2009).
235
United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Bajakajian does not mandate the
consideration of any rigid set of factors . . . . We have, nevertheless, looked to factors similar to those used by
the Court in Bajakajian in our Excessive Fines Clause cases.”).
236
Id.; see also United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2008).
237
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998); see McLean, supra note 232, at 852.
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Bail Clause.238 Third, considering a defendant’s livelihood in the excessiveness
analysis is consistent with the historical analysis of the Excessive Fines
Clause.239
In Timbs, the Supreme Court also provided support for the new inability to
pay factor.240 The fact that a defendant’s livelihood is often an important factor
in determining the excessiveness of a forfeiture provides additional support for
determining the legitimacy of the forfeiture in the bankruptcy forum, before
property is taken from the estate as an exception to the automatic stay.241 This is
because a bankruptcy judge, in an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, would have
the most knowledge about the defendant-debtor’s livelihood.242 This argument
could ultimately serve as a defense raised by trustees or creditors.243
b. Importance of “Ability to Pay” as an Additional Factor
If “ability to pay” is recognized as an additional factor in the test for
excessiveness, then a debtor who has filed bankruptcy, or even a secured creditor
who is relying on their repayment in the bankruptcy proceeding, is more likely
to have the fine declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
The other factors from the proportionality test are also helpful to many
excessive fine arguments in a parallel bankruptcy and forfeiture proceeding. One
of the goals of bankruptcy is to give the debtor a fresh start and to repay creditors,
and the test for whether a forfeiture is excessive is if it is “grossly
disproportionate” to the gravity of the offense. Considering those two concepts
together, it is reasonable to conclude that it is grossly disproportionate to
interfere with the debtor’s fresh start and set them back further while also
making it harder for creditors to receive payment. This is especially true when
the “offense” is as simple as forgetting five bullets in your center console or
owning a restaurant that only accepts cash.244
238

McLean, supra note 232, at 852.
Id.
240
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 372 (1769)) (“[N]o man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or
personal estate will bear . . . .”)).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
See generally Eagle Pass Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUSTICE (2017), https://ij.org/case/eagle-pass-civilforfeiture/ (discussing case where Kentucky resident drove his nearly brand-new truck across the border into
Mexico to visit his cousin, but he forgot he had five bullets from a registered and lawful gun in the center console.
Agents kept his truck through civil forfeiture because it was used to transport “munitions of war”); Iowa
Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUSTICE (2014), https://ij.org/case/iowa-forfeiture/ (discussing case where restaurant
239
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There is hardly, if any, a level of culpability or harm to society from these
types of civil forfeitures. Yet, the people in these situations, especially if they
are debtors who have declared bankruptcy, may not be able to afford bringing
suit against the government to get their property. Civil forfeiture also punishes
creditors who were dependent upon these debtors and have done nothing wrong
to deserve the punishment. Therefore, the creditors or the trustee may want to
bring the suit using their own interest in the property as standing to assert the
excessive fine defense. However, unsecured creditors will not have a way to
bring the suit to recover the property in order to be paid. Therefore, it is
important that parties are able to assert the defense in the bankruptcy forum
when determining whether the automatic stay applies.
c. The Creditor Is the Proper Focus in the Excessiveness Inquiry
When thinking about “ability to pay” as a factor in the excessive fine
analysis, it is helpful that the debtor has filed for bankruptcy. However, when
considering culpability, a secured creditor is technically an owner of the
property, but most likely has no culpability in the crime committed. The question
then becomes, who is the proper focus of the excessiveness inquiry? This inquiry
is furthered by the Constitution’s requirement to consider the people who the
fine is meant to punish.245
In United States v. Ferro, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
corrected the district court’s excessive fines analysis.246 The Court considered
both an innocent owner defense and an excessiveness inquiry. In 1992, Robert
Ferro transferred ownership of “all of his property and possessions” to his wife
Maria Ferro.247 After the transfer, Robert was convicted of a felony for
possessing explosives.248 Robert was informed that he would not be able to
legally possess firearms after his conviction was final, but he lied and told his
wife that it was perfectly legal for him to still possess the firearms after his
conviction.249 In 2006, over a decade later, agents searched the Ferro’s home and
seized over 700 firearms, a vast majority of which, Maria did not know about.250
The government then filed civil forfeiture action over all of the firearms seized

owner only accepted cash, meaning she made frequent trips to the bank to keep the money safe, government
seized her entire bank account claiming she was “structuring” her deposits to be less than $10,000).
245
See United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012).
246
Id. at 1114–15.
247
Id. at 1107.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 1108.
250
Id.
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because they were illegally in the possession of a convicted felon.251 The
firearms seized were very valuable and rare: “Some of the firearms are goldplated; others are early twentieth-century rarities; several are valued at $10,000
or more.”252
Ferro’s wife, Maria, asserted an innocent owner defense and excessive fine
argument. The court denied her innocent owner defense explaining that she was
not innocent simply because she did not know it was illegal for her husband to
be in possession of the firearms. However, in its excessiveness inquiry, the Ninth
Circuit made it clear that the district court erred when it focused solely on
Robert’s conduct.253 The Court explained that the excessiveness test is not
simply whether the punishment is proportional to the crime that led to the
forfeiture since “nothing in Bajakajian directs a court to ignore the culpability
of the owner and focus solely on whether the fine is excessive given the conduct
that subjected the property to forfeiture . . . .”254
Maria was the owner of the firearms and was not charged with any crime, so
the court stated that her culpability must be considered in the excessiveness
analysis.255 Bajakajian was silent on the proper focus of the excessiveness
inquiry, but courts following the Supreme Court decision held that individual
culpability of the claimant, or the person actually punished by the fine, must be
considered when determining whether the forfeiture was an excessive fine.256
The government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3) requires the court to
“compare the forfeiture to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture,”257 but the court denied the statutory argument and stated that the
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the culpability of the property’s
owner.258
Combining the definition of “owner” in the statutory innocent owner
defense, which includes the trustee and secured creditors, with the reasoning in
Ferro, supports the conclusion that a trustee or creditor’s culpability should be
251

Id.
Id.
253
Id. at 1115 (“the caselaw in our circuit was clear that the excessiveness inquiry must focus, at least in
part, on the culpability of the owner.”) (internal quotations omitted).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 1116 (citing von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the
extent of the forfeiture bears no correlation either with Mrs. von Hofe’s minimal culpability or any harm she
purportedly caused because the Excessive Fines Clause precludes forfeiture of her entire one-half interest in 32
Medley Lane)).
257
Id. at 1116–17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3) (2018)).
258
Id. at 1117.
252
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assessed when conducting the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fine analysis. The
creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding are the claimants actually punished by
the fine when property is taken from the estate through forfeiture, so their lack
of culpability should be considered.
If the culpability of creditors is considered when determining whether the
forfeiture is excessive, then the forfeiture will likely be found to be excessive as
to the creditors. Therefore, the forfeiture cannot pass the pecuniary purpose and
public policy tests. Thus, the police power exception to the automatic stay should
not apply and the creditors should be protected from the debtor’s wrongdoings
as Congress originally intended.259
CONCLUSION
Government entities increasingly have begun to seek forfeiture more
pervasively and broadly. The forfeitures can be a significant amount of money,
highly valuable personal items, or even an entire business. Arguably, the
government has not seized property as a punishment or to recover costs, but to
profit and pay off debt.260 Viewing civil forfeitures as a “gold mine” or “pennies
from heaven” should not go unchecked.261 Public policy favors the creditors and
innocent parties with interests in the property that deserve to be paid their share
of the debtor’s assets.
Additionally, the Code also favors creditors, both secured and unsecured, as
Section 726 provides that forfeiture claims are relegated to fourth priority.262
“[Forfeiture claims] are to be treated as inferior and subordinate to the claims of
the unsecured creditors . . . The intent of Congress was that unsecured creditors
should be protected from ‘the debtor’s wrongdoing.’”263
In the cases where the forfeiture is excessive, as it often is, the bankruptcy
forum has a strong interest in its jurisdiction over the property. Therefore,
creditors and trustees should assert the possible constitutional defenses to the

259
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (2019) (“fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured,
for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising before the earlier of
the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages
are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim.”); see Sachs v. Ryan (In re
Ryan), 15 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981).
260
Carpenter, supra note 27 (surveying state laws).
261
Id. (quoting former Las Cruces, N.M., city attorney Harry S. “Pete” Connelly, Jr. and Columbia, Mo.,
police chief Kenneth M. Burton).
262
§ 726(a)(4).
263
In re Ryan, 15 B.R. at 520.
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civil forfeiture in bankruptcy court to determine if the forfeiture is legitimate and
if it should be exempt from the automatic stay. The innocent owner defense can
defeat the relation-back doctrine, which would mean that the property was in
fact part of the property of the estate. Also, the excessive fine argument can
determine that the forfeiture is punitive, and that the police power exception does
not apply. This means that the forfeiture action is stayed and proceeds are
distributed according to the order of distribution defined in the Code.
Despite all of the support for limiting civil forfeiture, its power in the courts
remains mostly unrestrained. Congress should provide clear direction to protect
innocent owners, or third parties such as trustees and creditors. The bankruptcy
court should retain jurisdiction over the property at issue to determine if the
forfeiture is even legitimate, and thus whether the property should be taken from
the property of estate at all. If the forfeiture is excessive and does not pass the
pecuniary purpose or public policy test, then it is not a police power exception
to the automatic stay.
Further, if the civil forfeiture is determined to be legitimate and the creditor’s
lack of culpability is not considered, the government still should not have the
ability to disregard innocent creditors’ ownership rights in the property without
just compensation. Therefore, the Attorney General should at least be held
accountable with the bankruptcy court and forced to work with the trustee when
distributing the proceeds of the forfeiture. Since the Supreme Court recently
recognized the need to limit civil forfeiture’s power generally, its power should
also be limited to protect innocent creditors.
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